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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Permitting Service of Process by Mail on
Japanese Defendants
I. INTRODUCTION
With Japan's rise as a leading world economic power and the
United States' emergence from isolationism after World War II, Japa-
nese commercial activity has become a large part of the United States
business climate.' Today, Japanese companies regularly invest in and
contract with United States businesses, invest in United States real
estate, and export Japanese goods to United States consumers. 2 As a
result, litigation involving Japanese companies has become an ines-
capable reality for both United States businesses and private
consumers.
3
1. For example, in 1980 alone, the United States imported $30.7 billion worth of mer-
chandise from Japan, constituting 12.75% of total United States imports for that year. See
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1989 788, 790 (109th ed.
1989).
2. See generally Japan's Money Troubles Begin to Jolt U.S. Economy, L.A. Times, Oct.
13, 1990, at 1, col. 4.
3. See Davies & Weinstock, The Service Of Process Overseas, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at
15, col. 3. The authors state:
With the growing presence in the United States of foreign investors and foreign
goods, American attorneys are finding it increasingly necessary to bring suit against
companies based overseas.
Indeed, when a foreign company simply possesses critical evidence but is other-
wise unnecessary to a multi-party lawsuit, being perhaps a shallow pocket, an attor-
ney may wish to add that company as a party to help ensure the availability against it
of American pretrial discovery devices. Whatever the reason for suing the foreign
national, service of process abroad may well be required.
Id. See also 4 C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1987).
The authors note that the
phenomenal expansion of international trade, communication, and travel in recent
decades has made it increasingly common for a potential defendant to be physically
in a foreign country at the time suit is commenced or to be a citizen of or an entity
created by another nation and located outside the United States.
Id. at 365. See also Comment, An Interpretation of the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents Concerning Personal Service in Japan, 6 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 143 (1983) ("Japanese imports constitute a large part of the total
merchandise imported by the United States. Commercial litigation between Japanese defend-
ants and American plaintiffs, therefore, is inevitable and has increased proportionately with
the increase in Japanese imports."); see generally Peterson, Jurisdiction and the Japanese De-
fendant, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 555 (1985).
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When a Japanese company is located within the United States,
service of process4 is a relatively simple procedure, governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in federal court and the applicable
state rules of civil procedure in state courts.5 However, when a plain-
tiff desires to bring suit in the United States against a Japanese com-
pany located in Japan, which has sufficient minimum contacts with
the United States to subject the company to personal jurisdiction,
6
service of process becomes more complex.
7
In order to simplify service of process in international litigation,
the United States in 1969 became a signatory to the Hague Conven-
tion on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters ("Convention").8  The Convention
4. Service of process is the
service of writs, summonses, etc., signifTying] the delivery to or leaving them with the
party to whom or with whom they ought to be delivered or left; and, when they are
so delivered they are then said to have been served.... The service must furnish
reasonable notice to defendants of proceedings to afford [the defendant] opportunity
to appear and be heard.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (5th ed. 1979). See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988) ("Service of process refers to a formal delivery of docu-
ments that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action.").
5. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); FED. R. CIv. P. 4.
6. This Comment will not discuss issues of personal jurisdiction, as it assumes the re-
quirements of personal jurisdiction are satisfied. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945) and its progeny, the Supreme Court defined the minimum requirements neces-
sary to subject a foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction in a United States forum. In Inter-
national Shoe, the Court held that in order to subject a defendant to judgment in personam,
due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum such
that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. 326 U.S. at 316. This Comment moves beyond issues of personal jurisdiction and
addresses the now common and problematic issue of serving a Japanese defendant.
7. Difficulties exist with service in a foreign country that do not exist with service within
the United States. C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 367. For example, a person
not qualified by the law of the foreign country to make service may be subject to criminal
sanctions or other constraints if that person attempts to serve process according to United
States procedures. Also, some countries view service of process within their borders as a judi-
cial and, therefore, sovereign act. Finally, enforcement of judgments rendered in United States
courts against foreign defendants may be problematic if the particular foreign country does not
recognize the manner in which original service was made. See id.
8. The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,
T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention is reprinted in
28 U.S.C.A., FED. R. CIv. P. 4, app. at 138 (West Supp. 1990) and in VIII MARTINDALE-
HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, Part VII, at 1 (1990). For a quick reference guide to the Conven-
tion, see HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK
ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE
ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MAT-
TERS (1983).
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provides several methods by which a litigant of one signatory state to
the Convention may effect service of process upon a potential litigant
who is a member of another signatory state.9 The basic method guar-
anteed by the Convention is service through a signatory's designated
Central Authority.' 0 This method can be cumbersome, expensive,
and time consuming." The Convention, however, provides several
alternative methods of service on defendants who are members of sig-
natory states that have not objected to the particular alternative
method. 12
Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention provide two of these alterna-
tives,' 3 while article 10 arguably provides three more alternatives.'
4
9. Convention, supra note 8.
10. Convention, supra note 8, arts. 2-7 (defining the role of a Central Authority desig-
nated pursuant to the Convention). For a discussion of the power of designated Central Au-
thorities under the Convention, see infra text accompanying notes 45-58.
11. Service through a state's Central Authority requires the serving party to fill out a
request for service conforming to the Convention's model request form. Convention, supra
note 8, art. 3. The request form must be attached to the documents the applicant is serving,
and all the documents must be provided in duplicate to the receiving state's Central Authority.
Id. The Central Authority can further require that the serving party translate the documents
into the receiving state's official language. Id. art. 5. This whole process can be difficult and
expensive, especially if the receiving state's Central Authority requires the plaintiff to translate
the documents into a foreign language. The plaintiff would have to find and employ a person
knowledgeable in the particular foreign language.
Furthermore, the Convention also empowers the Central Authority to reject the docu-
ments if it does not believe the documents conform to the Convention's requirements. Id. art.
4. This could cause delays in service if the Central Authority finds defects in the request.
Even if the particular defects would not impair the addressee's actual notice, the Central Au-
thority could rightfully reject the documents and require the plaintiff to remedy the defect and
reapply for service. After the receiving state's Central Authority determines the documents
are acceptable, the Central Authority then serves the documents on the party addressed. Id.
art. 5. Therefore, the Central Authority acts as a middle man, causing a substantial time delay
between transmission of the documents by the plaintiff and actual receipt by the potential
defendant.
Several courts have recognized the burdensome requirements of service through a state's
Central Authority. See, e.g., Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 123 F.R.D. 595, 599 (W.D.
Ark. 1989) (quoting Routh, Litigation Between Japanese and American Parties, CURRENT
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 190-91 (1978) ("The
(C]onvention sets up a rather cumbersome and involved procedure for service of process."));
McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp., 726 F. Supp. 822, 826 (N.D. Fla. 1989) ("Article 10(a) may
merely make clear that such post-service official documents need not be routed through the
Central Authority, or meet the Convention's burdensome requirements of translation and the
like.").
12. Convention, supra note 8, arts. 8-10. A signatory to the Convention can object to the
alternative methods of service outlined in articles 8 and 10 by filing an objection with the
ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Id. art. 21. See also infra text accompanying
notes 68-70.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 59-63.
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For plaintiffs seeking to serve foreign defendants, use of any of the
alternative methods outlined in article 10 is less cumbersome than the
use of a state's designated Central Authority 5 and more consistent
with United States' federal and state rules governing service of pro-
cess. 16 Japan has expressly objected to two of the alternative methods
of service provided for under article 10.17 Japan has not, however,
objected to what is arguably a third method, outlined in paragraph (a)
of article 10.18
Article 10(a) allows a litigant "the freedom to send judicial docu-
ments by postal channels, directly to persons abroad."' 19 Since the
United States and Japan 20 adopted the Convention, the meaning of
article 10(a) has become one of the most litigated provisions of the
Convention in United States courts. 21 Several courts have held that
article 10(a) allows service of process by mail on a Japanese defend-
ant, 22 while many other courts have reached the opposite conclu-
sion.23 As a result, needless litigation has recently flooded the courts
over the availability of postal channels to United States plaintiffs at-
tempting to serve process on Japanese defendants. Furthermore, judi-
cial interpretations of article 10(a), both allowing and disallowing
service of process by mail, have consistently employed faulty or in-
complete analyses. This has led to precedential authority based on
erroneous interpretations of facts,24 textual meaning, legislative in-
tent, and inapplicable canons of statutory construction.
25
During the last few years, judicial disagreement over the mean-
14. See infra text accompanying note 64.
15. Id.; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 96-101; compare Convention, supra note 8, arts. 8-
10 with FED. R. Civ. P. 4 and CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 415.40 (West Supp. 1990).
17. Convention, supra note 8. For the significance of Japan's objections, see supra note
12 and accompanying text.
18. Convention, supra note 8, art. 10.
19. Id.
20. Convention, supra note 8; see also infra text accompanying notes 33-38.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97; see also Comment, Service of Process
Abroad Under The Hague Convention, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 676 (1988).
22. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying note 267; see also Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33
Cal. App. 3d 808, 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 210-21. For a general criticism of United States
courts' interpretations of article 10(a) as allowing service of process by mail on a Japanese
defendant, see Fujita, Service of American Process upon Japanese Nationals by Registered Air-
mail and Enforceability of Resulting American Judgments in Japan, 12 LAW IN JAPAN 68
(1979).
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ing of article 10(a) has grown, 26 reaching a stage at which a logical
analysis of its meaning is critical. Such an analysis would provide
much needed guidance to United States plaintiffs who serve increasing
numbers of Japanese defendants. Additionally, the alarming recent
trend of judicial authority toward the erroneous interpretation of arti-
cle 10(a)-denying service of process by mail on Japanese defend-
ants-places an unnecessary and unfair burden on United States
litigants.27
This Comment will analyze the Convention and the split in judi-
cial interpretations of article 10(a). It will examine the opinions that
do not allow service of process by mail on Japanese defendants under
article 10(a) and will suggest that these decisions are based on unduly
restrictive interpretations of the plain language and purpose of the
Convention. This Comment will also criticize the unfortunate ana-
lytical weaknesses in the decisions that have allowed service of pro-
cess by mail on Japanese defendants. Additionally, this Comment
will propose an analysis of article 10(a) that demonstrates that the
Convention permits service of process by mail on Japanese defend-
ants, until Japan formally objects to this method. Finally, this Com-
ment will conclude that current judicial interpretations of article
10(a), which refuse to allow service of process by mail, place an undue
burden on United States litigants and unfairly favor Japanese business
enterprises in the United States.
II. THE LAW OF THE CONVENTION
A. History and Purpose of the Convention
After World War II, the United States began to abandon its iso-
lationist policies.28 As a result, the United States' international busi-
ness and economic ties greatly increased. 29 The United States did not,
however, simultaneously modernize its procedures for service of pro-
cess on foreign litigants or for receipt of process by United States liti-
gants from abroad. 30 A simplified system of service of process
26. See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 387-90 and accompanying text.
28. See C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 367-68; Comment, supra note 21, at
652. Prior to World War II, pursuant to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States was reluc-
tant to get involved in foreign affairs.
29. See C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 367-68; Comment, supra note 21, at
652.
30. See C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 367-68; Comment, supra note 21, at
652; see also Comment, The Effect of The Hague Convention On Service Abroad Of Judicial
1991]
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between United States litigants and foreign litigants, including Japa-
nese companies, was, therefore, desperately needed.31
The Hague Convention was drafted in 1965 by delegates from
the United States and twenty-two other states, including Japan, to
address these and other related problems.32 The final draft of the
Convention was completed and opened for signature on November
15, 1965. 33 The United States became the first signatory to the Con-
vention when it ratified the Convention on August 24, 1967. 34 The
Convention entered into force for the United States on February 10,
1969. 35 Japan ratified the Convention shortly thereafter on May 28,
1970, and the Convention entered into force for Japan on July 27,
1970.36 Article 30 of the Convention provides that the Convention
shall remain in force for any signatory state for five years from the
date of its entry into force for that state. If the state has not de-
nounced the Convention, it shall be tacitly renewed for that state
And Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125,
126-28 (1969).
31. Prior to the United States' adoption of the Convention, United States litigants serving
process abroad were faced with the problem of trying to choose a method of service that met
constitutional due process requirements and was compatible with the local laws of the particu-
lar foreign state. This choice usually amounted to the United States litigant having to utilize
letters rogatory (a formal request, made by the court in which the action is pending, to a
foreign court to perform some judicial act) requesting service on the foreign litigant. See Com-
ment, supra note 21, at 653.
For a more extensive discussion of the problems facing both United States and foreign
litigants serving process in international litigation prior to the adoption of the Convention and
the obvious need for a simplified system for such service, see C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 3, at 367-68; Comment, supra note 21, at 652-54; see also Comment, The
"Mandatory" Nature of the Hague Service Convention in the United States is the Forum's Vic-
tory, 23 VAND. TRANSNAT'L L. 179 (1990).
32. See Note, The Interplay Between Domestic Rules Permitting Service Abroad by Mail
and the Hague Convention on Service: Proposing an Amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 335 (1989); Comment, The Effect of The Hague Convention
On Service Abroad Of Judicial And Extrajudicial Documents In Civil And Commercial Matters,
2 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125 (1969). The Convention was also designed to prescribe acceptable
criteria for rendering default judgments in the event a properly served defendant fails to ap-
pear. See Convention, supra note 8.
33. Convention, supra note 8.
34. Id.
35. Id. Since that time, twenty-eight other states have become signatories to the Conven-
tion making a total of twenty-nine in 1990. The signatories include: Antigua, Barbuda, Barba-
dos, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Cypress, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, the
Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, the Seychelles, Sweden, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
36. Id.
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every five years. 37 Since neither the United States nor Japan have de-
nounced the Convention since becoming signatories, the Convention
remains in force for both parties.
3
One of the main purposes of the Convention is to create a simple
and expeditious procedure for service of process on foreign litigants in
an effort to encourage judicial assistance and cooperation in interna-
tional litigation.39 The drafters made this purpose explicit in the pre-
amble to the Convention.40 The preamble states the drafters intended
the Convention: (1) "to create appropriate means to ensure that judi-
cial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought
to the notice of the addressee"; and (2) "to improve the organization
of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expe-
diting the procedure.
'41
B. Provisions of the Convention
The Convention's various provisions set forth the scope of its ap-
plicability and the methods by which judicial and extrajudicial docu-
ments may be served abroad. 42 Article 1 defines the broad scope of
37. Id. art. 30.
38. See VIII MARTINDALE-HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY Part VII, at 1 (1990).
39. See Convention, supra note 8, preamble; see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellshaft
v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 698 (1988). The other major purpose of the Convention is to ensure
that any method of service used between signatories to the Convention guarantees that the
receiving party actually receives notice of any suit initiated against that party. This purpose is
also explicitly stated in the preamble to the Convention. See id.; see also infra note 41.
40. Note, supra note 32, at 340.
41. See Convention, supra note 8, preamble (emphasis added). The preamble states:
The States signatory to the present Convention,
Desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial
documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in
sufficient time,
Desiring to improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance for that pur-
pose by simplifying and expediting the procedure,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed upon the
following provisions[.]
Id.
42. Id. The Convention also prescribes requirements that must be met before a default
judgment against a member of a signatory state can be entered. Article 15 states that:
[a] defendant shall not be adjudged to be in default until it is established that-
(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the
State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who
are within its territory, or
(b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by
another method provided for by the present Convention; and that in either of these
cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant
to defend.
Id. art. 15. Furthermore, each state is free to declare that default judgment may be given
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the Convention by stating that the Convention applies "in all cases, in
civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a ju-
dicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad. ' 43 Since both the
United States and Japan are Convention signatories, article 1 makes
clear that the Convention applies in all civil and commercial litigation
between United States and Japanese litigants.44
1. The Basic Method of Service Under the Convention
Articles 2 through 7 define the basic method of service under the
Convention. Article 2 requires each signatory state to recognize this
method of service in accordance with the Convention by stating:
"[e]ach contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which
will undertake to receive requests for service coming from other con-
tracting States. .. .-45 The United States has designated the Depart-
ments of State and Justice as its Central Authorities.46 Japan has
designated its Minister of Foreign Affairs as its Central Authority.47
Article 3 requires any authority or judicial officer, competent under
the law of the state in which the documents originate, to forward a
request for service to the Central Authority of the state addressed,
conforming to the model attached to the Convention.48 The docu-
"even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received," as long as: (a) the document
was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in the Convention; (b) a period of time,
not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge has elapsed since the document was
transmitted; and (c) no certificate was received, even though every reasonable effort has been
made to obtain it through the authorities of the state addressed. Id.
Finally, article 16 provides that in the event a default judgment is entered pursuant to the
Convention, a court has the power to relieve the defendant from the effects of the expiration of
the time for appeal from the judgment provided certain conditions are met. Id. art. 16.
43. Id. art. 1. See also infra note 213 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note
that article I of the Convention also requires that the address of the party to be served with the
document must be known, otherwise the Convention does not apply. See Convention, supra
note 8, art. 1. One commentator has concluded, therefore, that in a commercial case where the
address of the Japanese defendant to be served is not known, the Convention does not apply,
and "other methods such as service by publication may be utilized." Comment, supra note 3,
at 146.
44. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. Note that the Convention's applicability
is subject to the requirement that the United States plaintiff know the address of the Japanese
defendant. See supra note 43.
45. Convention, supra note 8, art. 2; see also 1 B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) 119 (1984) (The Convention "mandates" the estab-
lishment in each signatory state of a Central Authority).
46. Convention, supra note 8.
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 3. Model forms are attached to the Convention for all the particular docu-
ments required under it. See id.
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ment to be served or a copy must be attached to the request, and both
the request and document must be furnished in duplicate to the Cen-
tral Authority of the state addressed. 49 Under article 4, if the Central
Authority believes that the request does not comply with the provi-
sions of the Convention, it must promptly inform the applicant and
specify its objections to the request.50
Article 5 permits the Central Authority of the state addressed to
serve the document itself or arrange to have it served by an appropri-
ate agency. The Central Authority can serve the document either by
a method prescribed by its internal law or by a particular method
requested by the applicant, so long as the requested method is com-
patible with the law of the state addressed.51 Additionally, as long as
the receiving state's law permits, the document may be served by de-
livery to an addressee who accepts it voluntarily.5 2 Finally, the Cen-
tral Authority of the state addressed may require the document to be
written in, or translated into, that state's official language.
53
Article 6 requires the Central Authority of the state addressed,
or any authority it may have designated for that purpose, to complete
a certificate conforming to the model attached to the Convention.5
4
The certificate must state: (1) that the document has been served; (2)
the method, place, and date of service; and (3) the person to whom
the document was delivered. 55 If the document was not served, the
certificate must set forth the reasons preventing service.
56
Finally, documents served through a state's Central Authority
must meet certain language requirements. Article 7 provides that the
standard terms in the model Request, Certificate, and Summary of the
Document to be Served, attached to the Convention, must be written
in either French or English, and may additionally be written in the
official language of the state in which the documents originate.5 7 The
blanks in the forms must be completed in either the language of the
state addressed, or in French or English.
5 8
49. Id.
50. Id. art. 4.
51. Id. art. 5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 6.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 7.
58. Id.
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2. Alternative Methods of Service Under the Convention
The Convention also provides several alternative methods of ser-
vice.59 These alternative methods are outlined in articles 8 through
10.60 Article 8 allows service directly through a sending state's diplo-
matic or consular agents, provided that the state addressed has not
objected.6' Article 9 permits each state to use consular channels to
forward documents, for the purpose of service, to the authorities of
another state who are designated to receive such documents under
this article.62 Additionally, each state may use diplomatic channels
for this purpose if "exceptional circumstances so require."
63
Article 10 potentially provides three additional alternative meth-
ods of service. Article 10 states:
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present
Convention shall not interfere with-
(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, di-
rectly to persons abroad;
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent per-
sons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents
directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent
persons of the State of destination;
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to
effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial
officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of
destination."
Thus, the Convention explicitly provides four alternative service
methods to using a state's Central Authority: (1) service through dip-
lomatic or consular agents; (2) transmission of documents through
consular or diplomatic channels of the sending state for service by
officials of the state addressed; (3) service through each state's judicial
officers; and (4) service directly by a litigant through judicial officers
of the state addressed. Additionally, article 10(a) may allow service
directly by mail as a fifth alternative method. However, since article
59. Convention, supra note 8.
60. Id. arts. 8-10.
61. Id. art. 8. The receiving state is not free to object to this method of service if a
national of the state from which the documents originate is the party receiving process. Id.
62. Id. art. 9.
63. Id. What constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" is not defined in the Convention.
See id.
64. Id. art. 10.
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10(a) does not expressly contain the word "service," as this Comment
will discuss, the availability of this alternative is uncertain.
The Convention makes clear, however, that it is not intended to
invalidate more liberal methods of service that signatory states have
previously allowed or to which they have subsequently agreed. Arti-
cle 19 states that the Convention shall not prevent a sending party
from using methods of service that are permitted by the internal laws
of the receiving state, regardless of whether such methods are pro-
vided for in the Convention. 65 Similarly, article 11 provides that the
Convention will not prevent two or more signatory states from agree-
ing to permit methods of service of judicial documents through chan-
nels of transmission other than those provided for in the
Convention."
Finally, once a litigant has effected service in compliance with
the terms of the Convention, a signatory state must recognize such
service as valid. Article 13 makes this clear by stating that where a
request for service complies with the terms of the Convention, the
state addressed may refuse to comply with the service "only if it
deems that compliance would infringe its sovereignty or security.
'67
3. Japan's Objections to Alternative Methods of Service
Article 21 of the Convention allows a signatory state, at the time
it ratifies the Convention or at any time thereafter, to inform the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands of its opposition to the use
of methods of transmission pursuant to articles 8 and 10.68 The
United States has not objected to any of the alternative methods of
service outlined in articles 8 and 10.69 Japan, on the other hand, has
eliminated three of the alternative methods of service outlined in the
Convention.70
Japan has effectively eliminated the alternative method available
under article 9, which allows service through a sending state's consu-
lar agents to a designated authority of the receiving state. In its rati-
fying declaration of 1970, Japan stated that its Minister of Foreign
65. Id. art. 19.
66. Id. art. 11.
67. Id. art. 13.
68. Id. art. 21.
69. See VIII MARTINDALE-HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY Part VII, at 1 (1990).
70. Japan did not, however, object to article 8. See Convention, supra note 8. Therefore,
presumably a United States plaintiff could serve a Japanese defendant by having a United
States diplomatic official personally serve the document on the defendant in Japan. See id.
1991]
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Affairs was the authority competent to receive documents transmitted
through consular channels, pursuant to article 9.71 Since Japan's
Minister of Foreign Affairs is also its Central Authority pursuant to
article 5,72 Japan has effectively merged the alternative method avail-
able under article 9 into article 5. In either case, a plaintiff must de-
liver the documents to be served to Japan's Minister of Foreign
Affairs. Additionally, Japan expressly objected to the use of the
methods of service defined in paragraphs (b) and (c) of article 10.
7 3
Japan, therefore, will not permit a United States plaintiff74 to effect
service directly through a judicial officer, official, or other competent
person of Japan. 75 Japan did not, however, render any objection to
the method of service arguably allowed under article 10(a). 76 Fur-
thermore, Japan has not amended its original declaration of objec-
tions in the twenty years since it adopted the Convention.
77
C. Applicability of the Convention in United States Courts
The Convention governs the procedure a United States plaintiff
must use whenever serving a Japanese defendant located in Japan.
7 8
Neither federal nor state rules of civil procedure supersede the Con-
vention when a plaintiff serves a foreign national whose state is a sig-
natory to the Convention, as is Japan. 79 Therefore, the terms of the
Convention are applicable in all civil and commercial litigation in the
United States between United States and Japanese litigants.
1. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
Under article VI of the United States Constitution, all treaties
made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of
71. Id.
72. See id. art. 5.
73. Id.
74. In federal court, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows service of
process abroad to be made by any person who is not a party to the action and is not less than
18 years of age. FED. R. Civ. P. 4. Numerous other United States jurisdictions also permit
service by private parties, including a plaintiff's attorney. See Note, Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters under the Hague Convention, 3
REV. LiT. 493, 501 (1983); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 414.10 (West 1973).
75. See Convention, supra note 8. Under Japanese law, only official officers of the court
are "competent" to serve process upon a Japanese litigant. See Fujita, supra note 25.
76. See Convention, supra note 8.
77. See id.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 80-95; see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
79. See id.
[Vol. 13:551
1991] Service by Mail on Japanese Defendants 563
the land.80 Several courts have held that the Convention has the sta-
tus of a treaty.81 Therefore, the provisions of the Convention have
authority equivalent to any federal law. 2 As a result, so long as the
Convention does not transgress constitutional restrictions, a United
States court must abide by its terms.8 3 Service of process, the subject
of the Convention, is generally tested against the constitutional re-
quirements of adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, as
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
8 4
The Convention has yet to be challenged on the grounds that it vio-
lates due process.8 5 This is true probably because convention drafters
apparently considered United States constitutional due process re-
80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The Court held that "[a]ll constitu-
tional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department, have as much legal
validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature .... A treaty is a 'Law of the
Land' under the supremacy clause (Art. VI, cl. 2) of the Constitution." Id. at 230. Further,
"state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a
treaty or of an international compact or agreement." Id. at 230-31.
81. Eg., Newport Components v. NEC Home Electronics, 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1541
(C.D. Cal. 1987); Cooper v. McKita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 17 (D. Me. 1987); Pochop v.
Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 465 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus-
tries, Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (E.D. Va. 1984); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries
Chemical Services, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1984); Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 595, 495 N.E.2d 1114, 1115 (1986); Ex Parte Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1983); Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A.G.
v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 757-58 n.1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155, 156 n.1 (1981).
82. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Pink, 315 U.S. at 230.
83. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("No agreement with a foreign nation can ...
[be] free from the restraints of the Constitution.").
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). The
Court stated:
That... substituted service may be wholly adequate to meet the requirements of due
process was recognized by this Court .... Its adequacy so far as due process is
concerned is dependent on whether or not the form of substituted service provided
for such cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give... actual notice of the
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.
Id. at 463; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "An elemen-
tary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Id. at 314.
85. See Comment, supra note 21, at 660.
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quirements and incorporated them into the Convention.8 6 Therefore,
under the Constitution, the Convention should apply in United States
courts.
2. Conflicts with State Rules of Civil Procedure
Conflicts between state rules of civil procedure governing service
of process and the provisions of the Convention are relatively easy to
resolve. Under the supremacy clause, treaties of the United States
preempt state law.87 Thus, as long as a treaty is constitutional, it can
regulate any matter within the territory of a state regardless of any
contrary state law.88 Accordingly, courts have regularly held that
where state service of process rules conflict with Convention proce-
dures, the Convention controls.8 9
3. Conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
A more complicated situation arises when the Convention con-
flicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.90 In federal courts,
the issue is whether the provisions for service under the Convention,
or the methods contained in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure govern the method of service a plaintiff must follow. This con-
flict is especially apparent in the controversy surrounding the
availability of service of process by mail arguably allowed under arti-
86. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SER-
VICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. Speaking about the Convention in his
statement to the Senate Committee, Richard D. Kearney, an official United States delegate to
the Convention, stated that "[u]nanimous agreement was reached upon a convention which
basically conforms to the American standards of procedural due process .... " Id. at 6-7. In
his report, Phillip W. Amram, also an official United States Convention delegate, stated "[the
Convention] recognizes the concept of due process in international litigation where the defend-
ant is a resident of a foreign country." Id. at 11; see also Convention, supra note 8 (preamble).
87. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Pink, 315 U.S. at 230-31.
88. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Pink, 315 U.S. at 230-31; Nielsen v. Johnson, 279
U.S. 47, 52 (1929); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
89. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988); Ackerman
v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1986); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Serv.,
100 F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1984); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 597 F. Supp. 1082,
1085-86 (E.D. Va. 1984); Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 145 Ill. App. 3d 594,
495 N.E.2d 1114 (1986); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1983).
90. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4. In federal courts, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gener-
ally apply. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). "When a situation is covered by one of
the Federal Rules .... [a federal] court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can
refuse to do so only if ... the Rule in question transgresses [either] the terms of the Enabling
Act [or] constitutional restrictions." Id. at 471.
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cle 10(a) of the Convention and clearly allowed under paragraph (i) of
Rule 4.91 Rule 4(i) provides, in relevant part, that a plaintiff may
serve a foreign defendant "by any form of mail, requiring a signed
receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court of the
party to be served."' 92 The Constitution provides no clear answer to
this situation.93 However, federal courts have apparently resolved the
conflict by applying the "doctrine of implied repeal." This doctrine
holds that the enactment later in time prevails. 94 Since the Conven-
tion was ratified in 1969, and Rule 4(i) was enacted in 1963, federal
courts have held that the Convention preempts Rule 4(i).95 As a re-
sult, a United States plaintiff cannot avoid the Convention's service
requirements by bringing suit in federal court.
III. THE CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY INTERPRETING ARTICLE
10(A) AND JAPAN'S SILENCE
Since the Convention applies whenever a United States plaintiff
serves process on a Japanese defendant in federal or state court, many
courts have been forced to interpret the terms of the Convention.
96
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 4. Rule 4(e) provides, in part, that whenever service is provided for
on "a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is held,
service may be made.., in a manner stated in this rule." Id. at 4(e). Rule 4(i) provides five
additional alternative methods of service a plaintiff may utilize when serving process on a
foreign defendant. See id. at 4(i). For a discussion on the conflict between service methods
allowed under Rule 4 and the provisions of the Convention, see Note, supra note 32, at 344-70.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
93. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
94. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119-20 (1932); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
95. E.g., Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Federal Rule 4 was
superseded by the Hague Convention and thus.., should not limit application of the conven-
tion."); Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., Ltd., 680 F. Supp. 847, 850 n. 1 (W.D. Tex.
1988); Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 17 (D. Me. 1987); Vorhees v. Fisher &
Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1983).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 131-277; see generally Wasden v. Yamaha Motor
Co., 131 F.R.D. 206 (M.D. Fla. 1990); McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp., 726 F. Supp. 822
(N.D. Fla. 1989); Meyers v. Asics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Bankston v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 123 F.R.D. 595 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989); Smith
v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Prost v. Honda Motor
Co., 122 F.R.D. 215 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16 (D.
Maine 1987); Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F.
Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456
(E.D.N.Y. 1986); Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Mommsen
v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. Ill.
1985); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 597 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Va. 1984); Chrysler
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984); Suzuki Motor Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988); Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d
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One of the greatest areas of controversy over the Convention is
whether article 10(a) allows service of process by mail on a Japanese
defendant. 97 This controversy arises because service of process by
mail is a common method of service for domestic litigants in both
federal and state courts. 98 Both federal and state rules of civil proce-
dure generally allow for service of process by mail.99 A plain reading
of Rule 4(i) indicates that service of process by mail on a foreign de-
fendant is permissible without need to resort to any further regula-
tions.1co Therefore, it is probable that many attorneys who are not
experienced in litigating against Japanese defendants are not aware of
the Convention's provisions and applicability.' 0 As a result, many
United States plaintiffs' attorneys, completely unaware of the poten-
tial problems, may attempt service by mail on a Japanese defendant.
Unfortunately, even knowledgeable attorneys have been left
without definitive direction. Both federal and state courts are split on
whether article 10(a) of the Convention allows service by mail.10 2
One state court has even split between two of its appellate districts
over the issue.' 03 Furthermore, the various court opinions are gener-
ally based on very cursory reasoning, imprecise logic, or faulty inter-
pretations of the Convention. ' °4 Therefore, guidance from the courts
remains confusing and unreliable. As a result, a plaintiff's decision to
97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 Misc. 2d 78, 493 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1985); Ormandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1984); Shoei Kako Co. v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
97. See Comment, supra note 21, at 676; see also infra text accompanying notes 131-277;
cases cited supra note 96.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 131-277.
99. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4; see, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 415.30 (West 1973).
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i); see also Note, supra note 32, at 344. "The parallel service
provisions of domestic law and the (Convention] foster confusion. The language of domestic
service rules is a trap for the unwary, often permitting service by mail to foreign parties with-
out limitation." Id.
101. See Note, supra note 32. The author observes that "[Rule 4(i)] permits service by
mail without imposing any restrictions or encouraging resort to the [Convention]. The accom-
panying advisory committee notes fail to mention the [Convention] .... Given the optional
and far-reaching language of Rule 4(i), attorneys plausibly could assume that no conflicting
legal obligation exists." Id. at 344.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 131-277.
103. Compare Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402
(Ist Dist. 1973) (holding service of process by registered mail upon a Japanese defendant was
permissible under article 10(a) of the Convention) with Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court,
200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (4th Dist. 1988) (declining to follow Shoei, and
holding service of process by registered mail on a Japanese defendant was not permissible
under article 10(a) of the Convention); see also infra text accompanying notes 261-77.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 131-281.
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serve a Japanese defendant by mail is open to attack by the defendant,
even where controlling precedent indicates it is permissible.10 5 Conse-
quently, a real need exists to resolve the issue with a logical analysis
that properly interprets the plain meaning and purpose of the
Convention.
A. The Need to Resort to Article 10(a)
The need to serve process on a Japanese defendant can arise in a
number of different contexts. Japanese products and business inter-
ests in United States markets are substantial.Il° As a result, cases in
which United States courts have interpreted article 10(a) most often
arise from claims by United States businesses or individuals against
Japanese companies.10 7
Due to increasing Japanese business competition in United States
domestic markets, United States businesses often resort to the courts
to settle commercial disputes against Japanese companies. These dis-
putes involve issues in contract, 08 antitrust,109 and patent infringe-
ment. 110 To adjudicate these disputes against a Japanese company
incorporated and located in Japan, the United States plaintiff must
often effect service of process upon the Japanese defendant in
Japan. I I '
Similarly, with the great influx of Japanese manufactured con-
sumer goods into United States markets, private individuals who are
injured by these goods must often turn to the courts to obtain com-
pensation." 2 Generally, these cases involve damages for personal in-
juries or wrongful death and allege claims in contract for breach of
105. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 261-77.
106. See supra notes 1 & 2.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 131-277.
108. See Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F.
Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182
(D.D.C. 1984).
109. See Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F.
Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182
(D.D.C. 1984).
110. See Meyers v. Asics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 131-277.
112. See, e.g., Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988);
Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus-
tries, 597 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Va. 1984); Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App.
3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988); Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808,
109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
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warranty and in tort for negligence and strict product liability."13 Es-
pecially in personal injury actions, the plaintiff must sue several de-
fendants. The parties generally named are the retailer, wholesaler or
distributor, and manufacturer of the allegedly defective product."
14
Almost invariably, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective prod-
uct is a Japanese company incorporated and located in Japan."15
Often the Japanese manufacturer introduced its product into the
United States market through a Japanese or United States distributor.
Thus, it may have insufficient contacts with the United States forum
where the suit is initiated to allow service of process upon it within
the United States. 16 As a result, the individual plaintiff is faced with
the difficult task of serving the Japanese manufacturer in Japan."17
Whether in commercial or civil litigation, United States plaintiffs
often attempt to serve the Japanese defendant in Japan directly by
mail.1 8 Plaintiffs choose to use postal channels to effect service of
process for a variety of reasons. Probably the most obvious reason is
that service by mail is generally easier and less expensive than per-
sonal service. 119 Since litigants generally desire to keep litigation costs
as low as possible, service by mail represents not only the most desira-
ble method, but also, in many cases, the only practical method.
Furthermore, service by mail satisfies due process requirements
of adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 120 Therefore, both
113. See, e.g., Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr.
376; Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402.
114. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 113.
115. See cases cited supra note 112.
116. Id. For a discussion of recent case law addressing the contacts necessary for a Japa-
nese company's United States subsidiary to constitute its agent for purposes of service of pro-
cess, see Comment, supra note 31 at 193-97. Note that the Supreme Court has held that if a
foreign company does have sufficient contacts with a subsidiary within the United States so
that the subsidiary constitutes its agent for purposes of service of process under the applicable
forum's law, the Convention does not apply to service on the company's United States subsidi-
ary. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
117. See cases cited supra note 112.
118. See cases cited supra note 96; see also infra text accompanying notes 131-277.
119. See C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, at 377. Personal service denotes ac-
tual delivery of process to the person to whom the process is directed or to someone authorized
to receive it in his behalf. Personal service is made by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to the person named, or by leaving it, or copies of it, at the person's dwelling or
usual place of abode with some responsible person, or by delivering a copy to an agent author-
ized to receive such. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (5th ed. 1979).
120. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of service of process by mail stating, "[h]owever it may
have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means
of communication." Id. at 319.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and most state rules of civil pro-
cedure specifically allow for service by mail, subject to certain condi-
tions.' 2' Because these rules basically involve the same requirements
for service of process on a foreign defendant as on a domestic defend-
ant, 22 the rules may easily mislead a plaintiff into believing the law
permits service by mail on a Japanese defendant located in Japan.
23
Plaintiffs, therefore, will often attempt service of process on a Japa-
nese defendant located in Japan directly by mail. 124 The Japanese de-
fendant will commonly respond by a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of service of process. Alternatively, the defendant may
move to quash for improper service, alleging that service of process by
mail on a Japanese company does not satisfy the Convention.
25
As a result, several state and federal courts have been faced with
interpreting the ambiguous language of article 10(a) to determine
whether it allows service of process by mail on a Japanese defend-
ant. 26 In attempting to interpret article 10(a), the courts have be-
come severely split. 27 Several early decisions held that article 10(a)
does allow service of process by mail and that Japan's failure to object
to article 10(a) meant that service of process by mail on a Japanese
defendant was permissible. 12  However, an equal number of courts
held that article 10(a) does not allow service of process by mail. 129
The more recent judicial trend is consistent with this latter
interpretation. 
30
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 4; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.30 (West 1973).
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 4; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.30 (West 1973); but see
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.10 (West Supp. 1990). Section 413.10 states that the California
rules are "subject to the provisions of the Convention on the 'Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents' in Civil or Commercial Matters." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 413.10(c) (West Supp. 1990).
123. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.




128. See Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Zis-
man v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. Il. 1985); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 597 F.
Supp. 1082 (E.D. Va. 1984); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182
(D.D.C. 1984).
129. See Prost v. Honda Motor Co., 122 F.R.D. 215 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Cooper v. Makita,
U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16 (D. Maine 1987); Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 11 F.R.D. 464
(S.D. Miss. 1986); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Suzuki Motor
Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988); Reynolds v. Koh,
109 A.D.2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 Misc. 2d 317,493
N.Y.S.2d 78 (1985); Ormandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1984).
130. See Prost, 122 F.R.D. at 216 ("More recent opinions believe that service by registered
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B. Cases Allowing Service by Mail
1. The Seminal Case
Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court,13 ' a California state court deci-
sion, is the oldest and most cited case holding that article 10(a) allows
service of process by mail on a Japanese defendant.' 32 Although part
of the basis for the Shoei court's holding relies on a faulty record,'
33
the court provides a substantially complete analysis of article 10(a) as
it relates to service on a Japanese defendant.'
34
Shoei was a typical personal injury action brought by a United
States plaintiff against a Japanese manufacturer. 3 5 The plaintiff sus-
tained severe bodily injuries in a traffic collision with another vehi-
cle. 136 The plaintiff filed suit in a California state court, alleging that
the collision and a defective safety helmet caused his injuries. 137 At
the time of the collision, the plaintiff was driving a motorcycle, wear-
ing a safety helmet designed and manufactured by the defendant,
Shoei Kako Company, a Japanese corporation with its principle place
of business in Tokyo. 38 The plaintiff alleged causes of action for
breach of warranty, negligence, and strict product liability against
Shoei. ' 39
Pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure,140 the plain-
tiff attempted to serve defendant Shoei with a copy of the summons
mail is improper."); see generally Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir.
1989); Wasden v. Yamaha Motor Co., 131 F.R.D. 206 (M.D. Fla. 1990); McClenon v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 726 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1989); Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200
Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988).
131. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
132. Id.
133. The record before the court erroneously indicated that service of process by direct
mail between litigants was permissible under the domestic law of Japan. Shoei, 33 Cal. App.
3d at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412; see also Suzuki, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1480-81, 249 Cal. Rptr.
at 379.
134. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973). For cases following Shoei, see,
e.g., Meyers v. Asics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku
Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home
Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Lemme v. Wine of Japan
Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589
F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984).
135. Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
136. Id. at 810, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
137. Id. at 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
138. Id. at 811, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
139. Id. at 810-11, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
140. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.40 (West Supp. 1990).
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and complaint by mail, requesting a return receipt.141 Defendant
Shoei did not return the formal acknowledgement of service, but ap-
parently received the summons and complaint because the plaintiff
produced an international mail receipt signed by an employee of
Shoei.142 After receiving the receipt, the plaintiff's attorney sent a
registered letter to Shoei alleging that the plaintiff had served Shoei in
a timely manner with a copy of the summons and complaint and that
the time to answer the complaint had expired.1 43 The letter further
threatened that the plaintiff would seek a default judgment unless
Shoei filed a responsive pleading. 14 Shortly thereafter, Shoei filed a
motion to quash service.145 Defendant Shoei argued that the method
used to perfect service of process, mail, did not comply with the
Convention. 146
The California Court of Appeal for the First District began its
141. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 815-16, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 406-08.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 817, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
145. Id.
146. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 403. Shoei also argued that, in the
alternative, service of process should be quashed because the notice given by the service failed
to comply with due process requirements since the documents transmitted by mail were not
written in Japanese. Id. The court found no merit to this argument. Id. The court recognized
that service was not made through Japan's designated Central Authority, so the plaintiff could
not "rely upon the authorization of English language contained in the treaty .. " Id. at 823,
109 Cal. Rptr. at 413. However, the court noted that the record before it indicated through
the declaration of a "qualified international lawyer" that in his experience all Japanese compa-
nies engaged in trade with other countries correspond with these other countries in the English
language and that "almost all Japanese companies involved in trade with other countries are
accustomed to receiving communications in English and have facilities" for interpreting and
translating the communications. Id. The court further noted that Shoei executed the postal
receipt which was written in English and French and that Shoei apparently authorized the use
of "brochures printed in English to further sales of its products" in California. Id. at 823-24,
109 Cal. Rptr. at 413. The court concluded that "[t]he special appearance [by Shoei] in these
proceedings bespeaks that the purport of the documents was understood" and, therefore,
"there was neither a lack of due process of law nor a violation of the letter or spirit of the
[Convention]." Id. at 824, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
Courts that have allowed service of process by mail on a Japanese defendant under article
10(a) have generally held that the documents (generally in English, one of the official lan-
guages of the Convention) need not be translated into the Japanese language. See, e.g., id. at
823-24, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 413; Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 464; Weight, 597 F. Supp. at 1086.
For a discussion of the requirement that documents served by mail on a Japanese defend-
ant must be translated into the Japanese language, compare Jorden, Beyond Jingoism: Service
By Mail To Japan and The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudi-
cial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 16 LAW IN JAPAN 69, 78 (1983) (arguing
translation is not required) with Fujita, supra note 25, at 79-80 (arguing translation is required
to satisfy due process requirements).
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analysis by referring to the supremacy clause 47 and noted that it
could not exercise jurisdiction if doing so would violate an interna-
tional treaty. 48 Having found the Convention applicable, the court
summarized the Convention's provisions149 and noted the Japanese
government's objections to articles 10(b) and (c).150
The court then addressed the parties' arguments. The plaintiff
argued that since article 10(a) binds both the United States and Japan,
the summons and complaint could be sent directly by mail to the de-
fendant Shoei.15' Shoei responded by arguing that while the Conven-
tion consistently refers to "service," article 10(a) specifically refers to
the freedom to "send" judicial documents by postal channels directly
to persons abroad, as distinguished from the transmission abroad for
the purposes of service. ' 5 2 Shoei further argued that article 10(a) does
not authorize service by mail, but merely authorizes the giving of no-
tices and exchange of other judicial documents after jurisdiction is
acquired. 5
3
The court, however, found that consideration of the entire scope
of the Convention outweighed any merit in Shoei's argument. 15 4 The
court pointed out that the Convention purports to deal with the sub-
ject of service abroad of judicial documents. 55 The court reasoned
that reference to the freedom to send judicial documents by postal
channels directly to persons abroad would be "superfluous" unless it
was related to the sending of such documents for the purpose of
service. '5
6
Next, the court noted that the reference to postal channels ap-
pears in the context of other alternatives to the use of the Central
Authority. 57 The court reasoned that if the purpose of the Conven-
tion is to establish one method of service to avoid the difficulties and
controversies of other methods, "it does not necessarily follow that
other methods may not be used if effective proof of delivery can be
147. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
148. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 818-19, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10. The court apparently
took for granted that the Convention had the status of a treaty. See id.
149. Id. at 819, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
150. Id. at 819-20, 109 Cal. Rptr at 410.
151. Id. at 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
152. Id. at 820, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
153. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 820-21, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
154. Id. at 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Convention, supra note 8, art. 10.
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made."' 158 The court then cited article 5 of the Convention (which
allows service if the addressee accepts the document voluntarily) and
concluded that the international mail receipt produced by the plaintiff
evidenced voluntary acceptance by Shoei.159
The court then turned to the provisions of Rule 4(i) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that the purpose of
Rule 4(i) was to expedite service of process abroad. 160 From this, the
court reasoned that an acceptance of Shoei's interpretation of the
Convention would mean that the Senate, in ratifying the Convention,
intended to abrogate what it had impliedly approved four years ear-
lier. 161 It is more reasonable, the court held, to infer that in approving
article 10(a), the Senate intended to retain service by mail as an effec-
tive method of service of process in a foreign country unless that
country objected to it. 162 The court noted further that if the Conven-
tion abrogated the provisions of Rule 4(i), then Rule 4(i) should have
been changed along with other revisions of the rules made after the
Convention went into effect.'
63
In further support of its reasoning, the court noted that Japan's
internal law allows service of process by mail with evidence of deliv-
ery.164 The court concluded that, in the absence of any objection by
Japan to article 10(a), service by mail on Shoei was proper under the
Convention. 165 The court believed this conclusion was "consistent
with both the letter and the spirit of the convention."'
166
2. Cases Following Shoei
The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia followed Shoei in Newport Components, Inc.. v. NEC Home
Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc.167 In Newport, two United States electronic
158. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 821-22, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr at 412.
163. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 821-22, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
164. Id. at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412; but see Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200
Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988). In Suzuki, the court correctly recognized that
the record before the Shoei court was erroneous and that the internal law of Japan does not
allow direct service by mail between litigants. Id. at 1480-81, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
165. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
166. Id. Although the Shoei court reached the correct conclusion, the court's analysis was
erroneous since it was based on a partially faulty record and an innacurate reading of the
provisions of the Convention. See infra text accompanying notes 210-17.
167. 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
1991] 573
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
equipment distributors brought suit against NEC Corporation, a Jap-
anese multinational manufacturer and distributor of electronic prod-
ucts, and two of its wholly owned subsidiaries. 68 The plaintiffs
alleged state and federal antitrust claims. 169 The plaintiffs served the
defendants, including NEC, by mail, 170 and NEC received process at
its mailing address in Japan.' 7' NEC moved to dismiss for insufficient
service of process, 172 however, arguing that service by mail upon it
was ineffective under the Convention.
73
The district court held that service of process by mail on a Japa-
nese defendant was proper. 174 The court found particularly persua-
sive the Shoei court's reasoning that if the purpose of the Convention
is to establish one method of service, it does not follow that other
methods may not be used if effective proof of delivery can be made. 1
75
The court noted that the California Code of Civil Procedure require-
ments assured proof of delivery. 1
76
The court further reasoned that this interpretation of the Con-
vention was consistent with the Ninth Circuit's views on the interface
between the Hague Conventions and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in the discovery context, 177 as articulated by the appellate court
in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court.178 In Societe Nationale, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted provisions of the Multilateral Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters ("Evidence Con-
vention"). 179 The court of appeals held that the Evidence Convention
was not intended to shield foreign litigants from the normal burdens
of litigation in American courts. 180 If the Evidence Convention sup-
planted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, foreign litigants would
168. Id. at 1528.
169. Id. at 1529.
170. Id. at 1541.
171. Id.
172. Newport, 671 F. Supp. at 1541.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1542.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Newport, 671 F. Supp. at 1542.
178. 788 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).
179. Multilateral Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S.
231 [hereinafter Evidence Convention].
180. Societe Nationale, 788 F.2d at 1411.
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have an extraordinary advantage in United States courts. 181 The
court of appeals concluded that a litigant should consider using the
Evidence Convention but need not actually utilize it in every case. 18 2
The Newport court applied this same analysis to the Convention.18 3
Finally, the Newport court noted that the Societe Nationale court
considered the degree of intrusion on the foreign sovereign as a major
factor in its analysis. 184 Applying the appellate court's reasoning, the
Newport court decided that NEC failed to show that service of process
by mail represented an intrusion on Japanese sovereignty. Therefore,
mail service on NEC was proper.185
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
allowed service by mail on a Japanese company in Chrysler Corp. v.
General Motors Corp.186 In Chrysler, Chrysler Corporation, a United
States corporation, brought an antitrust action against General Mo-
tors Corporation, also a United States corporation, and Toyota Motor
Corporation, a Japanese corporation. 8 7 Chrysler served Toyota by
registered mail at its corporate headquarters in Japan. 88 Toyota
completed and returned the receipt of service but later moved to dis-
miss for improper service under the Convention.189
The Chrysler court reached a similar conclusion to that reached
by the Newport court. The Chrysler court found that in the District of
Columbia Circuit, precedent established service of process from the
United States into a foreign country by registered mail as the least
intrusive means of service. 190 Noting that Japan had not objected to
article 10(a), the court concluded that service of process by mail on
Toyota was proper. ' 91
In Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc.,192 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed with the
181. Newport, 671 F. Supp. at 1542 (quoting Societe Nationale, 788 F.2d at 1411).
182. Id.
183. See id. But see supra text accompanying notes 42-44 and 78-95. The Convention
should apply in all cases where a United States litigant serves a Japanese defendant.
184. Newport, 671 F. Supp. at 1542.
185. Id. The United States District Court for the Central District of California followed
Newport in Meyers v. Asics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 1001 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
186. 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1206.
190. Id. (quoting F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300,
1313 n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
191. Chrysler, 589 F. Supp. at 1206.
192. 631 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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Chrysler court. In Lemme, the plaintiff, a United States corporation,
brought a breach of contract action against another United States cor-
poration and a Japanese corporation.1 93 Lemme attempted to serve
the Japanese corporation, Konishi Brewing Company, by direct mail
pursuant to Rule 4(e) and (i).194 Konishi moved to dismiss for insuffi-
cient service of process under the Convention.195
The court, following Shoei, held that service by mail on the Japa-
nese defendant was proper. 196 Defendant Konishi argued that it
would be "incongruous" for Japan to require that personal service be
made only through the Japanese Central Authority but also to permit
service by mail.1 97 The court dismissed Konishi's contention, reason-
ing that the argument only made sense if Japan's sole concern was the
reliability of the method used.19 8 The court stated that if Japan's
objectives were also to promote the least intrusive means of notifying
its citizens of lawsuits filed against them, it would be logical to permit
only representatives of the Central Authority or the postal service to
serve process.1 99 In other words, Japan may have rejected sections
10(b) and 10(c) because it was more concerned with "who [was] arriv-
ing on the doorstep of its citizen to serve process than with how that
process [was] served. ' 200 If this were true, the court reasoned, then
there was no incongruity in Japan's requirement that service can be
made only through the mail or the Central Authority. 20 1
Finally, in Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co.,202 Smith
brought a personal injury action against a Japanese manufacturer.
20 3
Smith served the defendant Dainichi by direct mail pursuant to a
Texas state rule of civil procedure. 2°4 Dainichi moved to dismiss for
insufficient service of process. 20 5
Dainichi argued that by expressly rejecting the type of service
authorized by article 10(b) and (c), which use the words "effect ser-
193. Id. at 458.
194. Id. at 462.
195. Id. at 458.
196. Id.





202. 680 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
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vice," while ratifying article 10(a), which uses the word "send," Japan
intended to draw a distinction between judicial documents sent
through the mails for the purpose of "service" and those sent for
other purposes. 206 The court characterized this argument as a
"hyper-technical interpretation."207 The court reasoned that the use
of the word "send" rather than "service" must instead be attributed
to careless drafting.20 8 It decided that there was no significant distinc-
tion between the use of "send" in article 10(a) and the words "effect
service" in articles 10(b) and (c). The court concluded that allowing
such a distinction to prohibit service of process directly by mail under
article 10(a) would "elevate form over substance." 209
3. The Inadequacies of Current Authority Allowing
Service by Mail
Unfortunately, cases concluding that article 10(a) allows service
of process by mail on a Japanese defendant, while reaching the correct
conclusion, are based largely on faulty or cursory reasoning and inac-
curate facts. Shoei represents the leading case. It was directly fol-
lowed by the federal court in Newport 210 and is relied upon by most
other courts allowing service of process by mail.21' However, the
Shoei court reasoned that if the Japanese defendant actually received
notice, the specific method of service the plaintiff employed need not
be one specifically authorized by the Convention and agreed to by
Japan.212 This logic ignores the plain meaning and purpose of the
Convention. The Convention was designed to prescribe the sole
method of service between its signatories. 21 3 Therefore, whether the
206. Id. at 850.
207. Smith, 680 F. Supp. at 850.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Newport, 671 F. Supp. at 1542.
211. See, e.g., Smith, 680 F. Supp. at 850; Lemme, 631 F. Supp. at 463; Chrysler, 589 F.
Supp. at 1206.
212. Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
213. See Convention, supra note 8. "The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in
civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial
document for service abroad." Id. art. 1; Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486
U.S. 694, 699-700 (1988) (the Convention applies anytime a United States litigant must send
service of process documents abroad to a litigant who is a member of another signatory state);
see also Wasden v. Yamaha Motor Co., 131 F.R.D. 206 (M.D. Fla. 1989); McClenon v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 726 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1989); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D.
Iowa 1985); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chemical Serv., 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D. La.
1984).
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Japanese defendant received notice, in spite of the method used, is
irrelevant. A United States plaintiff must serve a Japanese defendant
in accordance with the Convention. The Shoei court should have fo-
cused solely on whether article 10(a) allows service of process by
mail-the method of service employed by the plaintiff in that case.
Furthermore, the Shoei court erroneously cited article 5 for the
proposition that anytime a defendant accepts a document voluntarily,
the requirements of the Convention are met.2 14 In doing so, the court
overlooked the fact that article 5's "voluntary acceptance" provision
applies only to service through the receiving state's Central Author-
ity.215 Furthermore, the ultimate method of service the Central Au-
thority uses, even when a defendant accepts the document voluntarily,
must be compatible with the law of the state addressed.21 6 It is un-
clear whether the Shoei court even considered this second require-
ment since it labored under the erroneous impression that Japan's
internal law allowed service of process by mail, with evidence of deliv-
ery.21 7 Therefore, the leading case allowing service of process by mail
under article 10(a) is unfortunately based largely on faulty reasoning
and clearly erroneous facts.
This same faulty analysis persuaded the Newport court.21 8 Addi-
tionally, the Newport court supported its decision by referring to a
circuit court case that interpreted a completely different Hague Con-
vention.21 9 Although the arguments used by the Societe Nationale
court in interpreting the Evidence Convention may apply to the Con-
vention, 220 the Newport court should not have relied so heavily on the
interpretation of a completely different and unrelated convention.
214. Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
215. Convention, supra note 8, art. 5.
216. Id.
217. See Shoei, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412; see also Suzuki, 200 Cal.
App. 3d at 1480-81, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
218. Newport, 671 F. Supp. at 1542.
219. The Newport court relied heavily on the court of appeals' analysis of the Evidence
Convention in Societe Nationale to bolster its conclusion. See id. at 1542.
220. See infra text accompanying notes 384-88. The appellate court in Societe Nationale
based its decision largely on the fact that the Evidence Convention before it did not state that
its provisions were mandatory or the exclusive means available to a plaintiff. Societe Nation-
ale, 788 F.2d at 1410. The Convention at issue here, however, states that its provisions are
mandatory. See supra note 213. The Supreme Court has specifically noted the distinction
between the mandatory language of the Convention and the optional language of the Evidence
Convention. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court,
482 U.S. 522, 534 n.15 (1987). Therefore, much of the Societe Nationale court of appeals'
analysis should not apply to an interpretation of the Convention at issue here.
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The Shoei and Newport decisions greatly influenced subsequent
courts which have held that article 10(a) allows service of process by
mail on a Japanese defendant. 221 The result is a line of precedential
authority that provides unclear guidance for United States plaintiffs
seeking to serve Japanese defendants.
C. Cases Denying Service by Mail
Partially in response to the faulty reasoning in the cases allowing
service of process by mail, several courts have concluded that article
10(a) was not intended to allow service by mail.222 Additionally, this
interpretation appears to be the modem trend.223 New York state
courts were the first to reach this conclusion with regard to a Japanese
defendant. 2
24
1. New York State Court Cases
Ordmandy v. Lynn 225 is the seminal New York case. In Ord-
mandy, the plaintiff served process on the defendant Toyota Motor
Corporation, a Japanese corporation, by registered mail pursuant to
New York law.226 Toyota moved to dismiss for insufficient service. 22'
The New York trial court turned to the Convention to determine
whether it permitted service of process by mail.228
Noting that Japan had not objected to article 10(a), 229 the court
decided it must first examine the article's plain meaning.230 It pointed
out that the Convention did not define the term "send. ' 231 It also
decided that there was no controlling or persuasive authority as to
whether the term "send" means or may include "service" in a "tech-
221. See, e.g., Meyers, 711 F. Supp. at 1007; Chrysler, 589 F. Supp. at 1206; Lemme, 631
F. Supp. at 463; Smith, 680 F. Supp. at 850; Weight, 597 F. Supp. at 1085-86; Zisman, 106
F.R.D. at 199.
222. See cases cited supra note 129.
223. See cases cited supra note 130.
224. See Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 Misc. 2d 317, 493 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1985); Reyn-
olds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985); Ordmandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954,
472 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1984). Ordmandy appears to be the first reported case squarely concluding
that article 10(a) does not allow service of process by mail on a Japanese defendant.





230. Ordmandy, 122 Misc. 2d at 954-55, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75. For the text of article
10, see supra text accompanying note 64.
231. Id. at 955, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
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nical legal sense. ' 232 The court, therefore, turned to the intent of the
parties to the Convention as evidenced by its provisions and the ordi-
nary meaning of the word "send. '233 It found that the ordinary
meaning of "send" is "to dispatch or transmit. ' 234 The court con-
cluded that since every other provision of the Convention uses the
word "service" when prescribing approved methods of transmission
for service, and since liberally reading the word "send" to include
effective service of legal process would "vitiate the fundamental intent
of the parties to establish more formal modes of service," article 10(a)
did not authorize service of process by mail.
235
The New York Court of Appeals followed Ordmandy in
Reynolds v. Koh. 236 The Reynolds court emphasized the fact that arti-
cle 10(a) refers to "send," whereas other articles of the Convention
repeatedly refer to "service" of documents. The court reasoned that
this indicated that article 10(a) was meant to authorize something
other than "service in the legal sense." 237 The court suggested that
article 10(a) merely authorizes transmittal of notices and legal docu-
ments which need not be "served. ' 238 Holding otherwise, the court
reasoned, would relegate the role of the Japanese Minister for Foreign
Affairs in a way that seems contrary to the Convention's import.
239
2. Federal Cases Following the New York Interpretation
Several federal courts have followed the New York state courts'
interpretation of article 10(a). The first court to do so was the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa in Mommsen
v. Toro Co.24° In Mommsen, the plaintiff brought a products liability




235. Ordmandy, 122 Misc.2d at 955, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
236. 109 A.D.2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985). The Reynolds court reviewed the Califor-
nia court's holding in Shoei and rejected it in favor of the reasoning in Ordmandy. Id at 99,
490 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
237. Id. at 100, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
238. Id. at 99, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 297-98.
239. Id. at 100, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
240. 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
241. Id. Mommsen is typical of the problems a plaintiff may face serving a Japanese cor-
poration. See also McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp. 726 F. Supp. 822, 823 (N.D. Fla. 1989).
In Mommsen, the plaintiff initially attempted to serve the Japanese defendant, Kioritz Corpo-
ration, by serving a summons and complaint upon an attorney in Chicago, Illinois as Kioritz's
agent. 108 F.R.D. at 444. Kioritz moved to dismiss alleging that the Chicago attorney was
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fendant's motion to quash for insufficient service under the
Convention.
242
The Mommsen court, following Ordmandy, held that article
10(a) does not expressly allow "service" of judicial process by mail,
but merely permits a litigant to "send" judicial documents by mail to
persons abroad.243 To support its conclusion, the court relied on fa-
miliar canons of statutory construction and began with an interpreta-
tion of the statute itself. The court noted that absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the statute's language
controls.2 " Furthermore, where a legislative body includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of
the same statute, a court generally presumes the legislative body acted
intentionally and purposely in including or excluding the language.2
45
Finally, the court noted that where a legislative body uses terms that
have accumulated meaning under either equity or common law, a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that the legisla-
tive body meant to incorporate the term's established meaning.
246
Based on these principles of statutory interpretation, the court rea-
soned that if the Convention's drafters had meant article 10(a) to pro-
vide an additional manner of service of judicial documents, they
would have used the word "service. ' 247 The court concluded that in-
terpreting article 10(a) to permit direct mail service of process would
go beyond the plain meaning of the word "send" and create a method
of service of process "at odds" with the other methods of service per-
mitted by the Convention. 248
Similarly, in Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp.,249 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, after re-
viewing a number of the above cases, concluded article 10(a) did not
not its agent, officer, or employee. Id. The plaintiff then filed the summons and complaint
with the Iowa Secretary of State and mailed notification of the filing together with a copy of
the summons and complaint to Kioritz in Japan by registered mail, in accordance with Iowa's
state rules of civil procedure. Id. at 444-45. Kioritz responded by supplementing and enlarg-
ing its motion to challenge the sufficiency of service on the ground that service by mail violated
the Convention. Id. at 445.
242. Mommsen, 108 F.R.D. at 446.
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 447 U.S. 102
(1980)).
245. Id. at 446 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)).
246. Id. (citing National Labor Relations Bd. v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322 (1981)).
247. Mommsen, 108 F.R.D. at 446.
248. Id.
249. 123 F.R.D. 595 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 889 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989).
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allow service by mail. 250 The opinion of a leading expert in Japanese
law persuaded the Bankston court.25' The court adopted the com-
mentator's opinion that the Convention does not address service of
process by mail. 252 Instead, the court opined, it merely discusses the
right to "send" judicial documents by mail after the plaintiff accom-
plishes "service. ' 25 3 The court claimed that any other interpretation
would produce an illogical result. 254 The court further noted that the
Convention sets up a "rather cumbersome and involved procedure"
for service of process, and if article 10(a) allowed one to "circumvent"
this procedure by simply sending something through the mail, the
"vast bulk of the Convention would be useless. ' 255 The court con-
cluded that it was inconceivable that the drafters of the Convention
would use the word "send" in article 10(a) to mean service of process
when they "so carefully" used the word "service" in other sections of
the Convention.
25 6
Finally, in McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp.,257 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida reasoned that the
phrase "judicial documents" used throughout article 10 could reason-
ably be construed as applying to "orders, notices, motions, and all
other such litigation-related documents. '258 The court decided it was
not a term that could be restricted to a summons and complaint.
259
The court concluded that article 10(a) may merely make clear that a
litigant need not route such post-service official documents through a
state's Central Authority, and that such documents do not have to
meet the Convention's "burdensome requirements of translation and
the like. ' ' 26°
3. Shoei's Rejection in California
The California Court of Appeal returned to the meaning of arti-
cle 10(a) fifteen years after Shoei in Suzuki Motor Co. v. Superior
250. Id. at 595.
251. Id. at 599.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Bankston, 123 F.R.D. at 599.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 726 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1989).
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Court.261 In Suzuki, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District expressly declined to follow Shoei and held that article 10(a)
did not allow service of process by mail on a Japanese defendant.
262
In Suzuki, the plaintiff brought a personal injury action against a
Japanese manufacturer.263 The plaintiff served the defendant by di-
rect mail pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure.2 " The
defendant Suzuki moved to quash service as improper under the Con-
vention. 265 The court agreed with Suzuki and granted the motion. 26
6
Beginning with a review of the Shoei decision, the Suzuki court
noted that Japan's internal law does not permit direct service of pro-
cess by mail.267 Instead, Japanese law requires the court clerk to
stamp the envelope containing the documents to be served with a no-
tice of special service. 26 1 The mail carrier then acts as a special officer
of the court in transmitting the documents. 269 Given the fact that
Japan itself does not recognize service by mail, the court concluded
that it was extremely unlikely that by failing to object to article 10(a),
Japan intended to authorize service by mail.27 0 This is particularly
true, the court reasoned, since Japan specifically objected to the more
formal modes of service under article 10(b) and (c). 27 I The court
stated that it was more likely that Japan interpreted article 10(a) as
allowing only the transmission of judicial documents and not service
of process. 272 The court felt this interpretation was reasonable, espe-
cially given the Convention's repeated references to "service" as op-
posed to "send. '27
3
Under "well recognized" canons of statutory interpretation, the
court of appeals felt it should give words in a statute their common
and ordinary meaning; it should presume that every word and phrase
used in a statute has a particular meaning and performs a useful func-
tion.27 4 The common, ordinary meaning of "send" is "'to cause to be
261. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988).
262. Id. at 1479, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
263. Id. at 1478, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Suzuki, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1479, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
267. Id. at 1480-81, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1481, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
270. Id.
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conveyed by an intermediary to a destination' or 'to dispatch, as by
mail or telegraph' not 'to serve.' "275 The court reasoned that the fact
the Convention's drafters used both the phrase "to send" and the
phrase "service of process" indicates they intended each phrase to
have a unique meaning and function. 276 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that interpreting "send" in article 10(a) to include "serve"
simply did not make sense.2 7
7
4. The Erroneous Analyses of Cases Disallowing Service by Mail
The New York cases, and decisions following them, give article
10(a) an overly restrictive and narrow construction. 27s By interpret-
ing article 10(a) as not allowing service of process, but merely the
"sending" of judicial documents by mail after service of process has
been accomplished, they have erroneously relied on inapplicable and
restrictive canons of statutory construction and have disregarded the
general rule of liberally interpreting international treaties or their
equivalent. 279 This approach led these courts to misread the provi-
sions of the Convention, thus failing to give proper import to its over-
all purpose.280 In addition, these courts have simply misconstrued
Japan's failure to object to article 10(a).
281
IV. PERMrITNG SERVICE BY MAIL ABSENT A
JAPANESE OBJECTION
Judicial attempts at interpreting article 10(a), and Japan's failure
to object to it, have failed to produce any definitive precedent either
allowing or disallowing service by mail. 282 Furthermore, neither the
cases interpreting article 10(a) as allowing service by mail, nor the
more recent cases reaching the opposite conclusion, provide persua-
275. Id.
276. Suzuki, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1481, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
277. Id. at 1482, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 225-77.
279. See, e.g., Mommsen, 108 F.R.D. at 446; Suzuki, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1481, 249 Cal.
Rptr. at 379; Ormandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1984). An international
treaty should be interpreted liberally. See infra note 294.
280. See infra text accompanying notes 289-350.
281. See infra text accompanying notes 369-93.
282. As this Comment points out, federal and state courts are severely split over the issue,
leaving subsequent courts two relatively equal lines of precedent from which to choose. See,
e.g., Wasden v. Yamaha Motor Co., 131 F.R.D. 206 (M.D. Fla. 1990). "Two distinct lines of
interpretation concerning Article 10(a) have arisen since the Convention's adoption .... This
court finds the second line of interpretation to be more persuasive." Id. at 209.
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sive reasoning. 83 This split in judicial authority creates confusion in
the law and, as a result, produces even greater problems for a United
States plaintiff attempting to serve a Japanese defendant. 28 4
For example, litigants will likely experience increased litigation
costs as a result of failed service attempts.285 Similarly, United States
plaintiffs are exposed to potential statute of limitations consequences
should service fail.28 6 In addition, disputes over arguably improper
service attempts under the Convention caused by confusion over gov-
erning law wastes valuable court time.28 7 Finally, this confusion over
governing law undermines the Convention's goal of simplifying inter-
national service of process methods to promote mutual judicial
assistance.
288
Therefore, a logical analysis of article 10(a) of the Convention is
needed. The interpretation that best comports with the plain meaning
of the Convention, its purpose, and the interests of the courts and
litigants involved, is that article 10(a) allows service of process by
mail on a Japanese defendant. Furthermore, ordinary treaty interpre-
tation rules support this conclusion.
A. Interpreting the Convention
1. The Analytical Structure
Because the Convention has the status of a treaty,28 9 courts
should construe the Convention consistent with traditional methods
of treaty interpretation. Like a statute, any analysis of the provisions
of a treaty begins with the plain meaning of its words.29° The context
283. See supra text accompanying notes 210-21 and 278-81.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 118-30.
285. See Note, supra note 32, at 335-52.
286. See id. at 352. However, courts have been reluctant to dismiss a plaintiff's case when
the plaintiff's method of service does not comply with the terms of the Convention. Instead,
courts have generally allowed plaintiffs a specified amount of extra time in which to effect
service in a manner consistent with the terms of the Convention. See, e.g., Prost, 122 F.R.D. at
217 (granting the plaintiff 90 days to serve the defendant in accordance with the Convention);
Pochop, Ill F.R.D. at 467 (granting the plaintiff 45 days to perfect service); Bankston, 889
F.2d at 175 (remanding for proper service within a "reasonable" time); Wasden, 131 F.R.D. at
210 (granting 30 days to perfect proper service); McClenon, 726 F. Supp. at 827 (granting 30
days to effect service); see generally Cooper, 117 F.R.D. at 18-19; Mommsen, 108 F.R.D. at
446.
287. See Note, supra note 32, at 352.
288. Convention, supra note 8, preamble.
289. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
290. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1984) (interpreting the word "accident" by examin-
ing its plain meaning and the context in which the term was used within the text of a treaty).
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in which the words are used within the treaty is also important. 291
Unlike a statute, however, a court must look beyond the plain mean-
ing of a treaty's words, 2 9 2 especially if those words are apparently
ambiguous.
29 3
Interpreting the text of a treaty requires especially liberal con-
struction of its provisions to give effect to the whole treaty's apparent
purpose, especially where the treaty can be fairly construed in two
different ways.294 Where it is possible to construct the treaty's provi-
sions in two different ways, one restrictive of rights, and the other
more liberal, a court should favor the more liberal construction. 295
Furthermore, a court should construct each provision of a treaty to
give a fair operation to the whole treaty. 296 A court should consider
several factors when interpreting a treaty, including the treaty's his-
tory, the negotiations leading to the treaty, the intent of the parties to
the treaty, and the practical construction of the treaty adopted by the
signatory parties. 297 Thus a complete analysis of the meaning of arti-
"The analysis [of a treaty] must begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the
written words are used." Id. at 396-97. See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988) (interpreting the phrases "occasion to transmit" and "for
service abroad" in the Convention at issue here); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatialle
v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987).
291. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1984).
292. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294 (1933) ("In ascertaining the meaning of a
treaty we may look beyond its written words."); Chocktaw Nation of Indians v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) ("Of course, treaties are construed more liberally .... and to
ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words."); Saks, 470 U.S. at 396;
Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700.
293. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700. In interpreting phrases of the Convention at issue here,
the Court stated: "Other general rules of [treaty] construction may be brought to bear on
different or ambiguous passages." Id. See also Factor, 290 U.S. at 294; Chocktaw, 318 U.S. at
431-32; Saks, 470 U.S. at 396.
294. Valentine v. United States ex tel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936) (obligations of a treaty
should be liberally construed so as to give effect to apparent intention of parties); Factor, 290
U.S. at 293 (treaty "obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent inten-
tion of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them"); Todok v. Union State
Bank of Harvard, 281 U.S. 449 (1930) (treaties should receive liberal construction to give effect
to their apparent purpose); see also Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) ("where a
treaty fairly admits of two constructions one restricting the rights that may be claimed under it
and the other enlarging them, the more liberal construction is preferred"); Asakura v. City of
Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924).
295. Jordan, 278 U.S. at 127; Asakura, 265 U.S. at 342; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S.
483, 487 (1879).
296. Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921).
297. Chocktaw, 318 U.S. at 432 (court may look to the history of the treaty, the negotia-
tions, and the practical construction adopted by the parties); Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699; Societe
Nationale, 482 U.S. at 534; Factor, 290 U.S. at 294.
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cle 10(a) and the effects of Japan's silence as to its provisions, should
involve each of these elements.
2. The Plain Meaning of Article 10(a)
The first step in analyzing article 10(a) involves a close examina-
tion of its plain meaning. 298 In examining the plain meaning, a court
should liberally construe the words.299 Cases interpreting article
10(a) as not allowing service of process by mail have not given liberal
effect to its provisions. Instead, they have done quite the opposite by
rendering overly narrow interpretations. 300
Article 10 states: "[p]rovided the State of destination does not
object, the present Convention shall not interfere with... the freedom
to send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to persons
abroad."30' The first issue is the meaning of the word "send." Web-
ster's Dictionary 302 defines "send" as "to cause to go or be carried; to
dispatch; to transmit; ... to dispatch. . . by mail, messenger etc. ' 303
The word "send" is thus relatively unambiguous. Its plain meaning
appears to allow a litigant to "dispatch" or "transmit" judicial docu-
ments by mail for any purpose, including service of process.
The next issue is whether a summons and complaint, documents
which when properly dispatched and received constitute service of
process, can be considered "judicial documents." The Convention
does not define the phrase "judicial documents." However, Black's
Law Dictionary 304 defines "judicial" as "[b]elonging to the office of a
judge; as judicial authority. Relating to or connected with the admin-
istration of justice .... Having the character of judgment or formal
legal procedure." 305 Certainly one can consider a summons and com-
plaint as "[r]elating to or connected with the administration of jus-
tice" and as "[h]aving the character of ... formal legal procedure."
298. Saks, 470 U.S. at 396-97; Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699; Societe Nationale, 482 U.S. at
534.
299. Todok v. United States Bank of Harvard, 281 U.S. 449 (1930); Valentine v. United
States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); Factor, 290 U.S. at 293; Asakura v. City of Seattle,
265 U.S. 332 (1924).
300. See, e.g., Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Reynolds v. Koh,
109 A.D.2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985); Ordmandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d
274 (1984).
301. Convention, supra note 8, art. 10 (emphasis added).
302. WEBSTER'S UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1651 (2d ed. 1983).
303. Id.
304. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 759 (5th ed. 1979).
305. Id.
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Finally, Webster's defines "document" as "anything printed, written,
etc., relied upon to record or prove something. ' ' 3°6 Summons and
complaints are "printed" or "written" and are definitely "relied upon
to record or prove something." A plaintiff relies on receipt of a sum-
mons and complaint to prove that the defendant had notice of the
initiation of a legal proceeding against it.307
Article 10(a) explicitly allows a plaintiff to send these documents
"by postal channels directly to persons abroad. ' 30 This phrase is
clear. Therefore, looking only at the plain meaning of article 10(a)
and giving it a liberal construction, it is exceedingly apparent that the
Convention allows a United States plaintiff to transmit service of pro-
cess documents by mail directly to a Japanese defendant.
3. The Context of the Words Within the Convention
A court must consider the context in which the words of article
10(a) are used within the Convention. 3 9 Many courts have looked to
other provisions in the Convention which prescribe various acceptable
methods of service. These courts have correctly noted that when pre-
scribing such acceptable methods the other provisions of the Conven-
tion use the word "service," which these courts argue, has special
legal significance. 310 The courts conclude that since article 10(a) con-
tains the word "send" instead of "service," it does not prescribe an
additional method of service of process, but merely refers to a method
for sending litigation documents after the plaintiff has perfected ser-
vice of process.
31'
Initially, this reasoning appears sound. However, this analysis
breaks down after taking into consideration the Convention's main
purposes. The Convention was aimed at addressing a specific prob-
lem in international litigation--organizing and establishing appropri-
ate and simplified methods of international service of process. 312 In
306. WEBSTER'S UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 540 (2d ed. 1983).
307. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
308. Convention, supra note 8, art. 10(a).
309. Saks, 470 U.S. at 396-97.
310. See Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Suzuki Motor Co. v.
Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988); Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.
2d 97, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1985); Ordmandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274
(1984).
311. See cases cited supra note 310.
312. Convention, supra note 8, preamble. The other main purpose is to ensure that de-
fendants receive adequate notice of suits pending against them. Id. Neither of these purposes
relates to sending judicial documents after a plaintiff accomplishes service of process.
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light of this purpose, article 10(a) would be completely out of context
in the Convention if it was not meant to provide another viable
method of "service." If the Convention's drafters intended to address
a completely different subject in article 10(a), they would have indi-
cated this more clearly. Furthermore, construing article 10(a) to
cover the topic of sending rather than serving judicial documents
would mean that in countries objecting to article 10 entirely parties
would be precluded from using the mail to conduct their litigation.
That would render international litigation in those countries practi-
cally impossible. 31
Additionally, article 10(a) appears in the middle of the section of
the Convention dealing with alternative methods of "service. 3 14 De-
spite the slight variation in language from "service" to "send," it is
implausible to suggest that the drafters of the Convention would ab-
ruptly switch from addressing acceptable methods of service of pro-
cess to methods of sending post "service" documents. Even more
inconceivable is that the very next sentence in the same article would
return to address the subject of service of process. The Convention's
drafters could not have intended to create such an awkward construc-
tion. Construing article 10(a) to merely encompass sending judicial
documents after a plaintiff effects "service" and not as prescribing an-
other acceptable method of service of process, ignores the context in
which the word "send" is used within the Convention.
Nevertheless, several courts have reasoned that because the Con-
vention sets up a complex procedure for service of process through a
state's Central Authority, article 10(a) could not allow service of pro-
cess by mail, since it would circumvent this cumbersome proce-
dure.315 However, this analysis similarly takes article 10(a) out of its
context within the Convention. The Convention's drafters specifically
placed article 10(a) within the section of the Convention containing
provisions that explicitly provide exceptions to allow "circumven-
tion" of the more cumbersome method of service.3 16 One of the Con-
vention's main purposes was to facilitate judicial cooperation in
international litigation by prescribing simple and expeditious methods
313. See Rich v. Kis California, Inc., 1988 WL 47605 (M.D.N.C.).
314. See Convention, supra notes 8, arts. 8-10.
315. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 123 F.R.D. 595 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd 889 F.2d 172
(8th Cir. 1989); McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp., 726 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Fla. 1989); Suzuki
Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d. 1476, 249 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1988).
316. Convention, supra note 8, arts. 8-10.
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of service.317 Furthermore, the Convention explicitly permits states to
use the most convenient methods of service for their litigants as long
as the other state involved does not object. 318 Therefore, interpreting
article 10(a) to allow service by mail does not "render the vast bulk of
the Convention ... useless. ' 319 Instead, article 10(a) supplements the
Convention's other provisions and helps to facilitate its various pur-
poses. 320 Consequently, examining article 10(a) within the context of
the Convention supports the conclusion that it permits "service" by
mail.
4. History of the Convention
An accurate interpretation of article 10(a) also requires a court
to look beyond the Convention's actual text,321 including the histori-
cal context in which the United States adopted the Convention. 322
The Convention was drafted in response to difficulties international
litigants experienced in effecting service of process. 323 United States
delegates to the Convention intended to eliminate procedural
problems encountered in international litigation, including difficulties
United States plaintiffs experienced trying to serve foreign defend-
ants. 324 The Convention attempted to alleviate these problems by
simplifying the procedure for service of process while assuring proce-
dural safeguards for defendants. 325 Rule 4 already allowed service of
process by mail on foreign defendants. 326 As such, the United States
Senate certainly did not intend to ratify an international Convention
that would impose barriers to international service not present in Rule
4.327 Such a decision would increase rather than decrease the difficul-
317. Id. preamble.
318. Id.
319. Bankston, 123 F.R.D. at 599.
320. See Convention, supra note 8.
321. Factor, 290 U.S. at 294; O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986); Saks, 470
U.S. at 396; Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699-700.
322. See Chocktaw, 318 U.S. at 432 (the Court may look to the history of a treaty);
Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699; Societe Nationale, 482 U.S. at 534.
323. For references discussing the extensive problems both United States and foreign liti-
gants were experiencing in this regard, see supra notes 29-32.
324. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 86.
325. Convention, supra note 8; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 86, at 1.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
327. This could occur, for example, when a signatory state to the Convention would have
accepted service of process by direct mail prior to ratifying the Convention. However, this
same state would now be unable to accept this form of service, absent a special agreement in
any given case, because this form of service would not comply with the terms of the
Convention.
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ties United States plaintiffs were experiencing at the time the Conven-
tion was drafted.
5. Negotiations Leading to the Convention
A similar conclusion may be reached by reviewing the negotia-
tions leading to the Convention. 328 The Report on the Draft Conven-
tion ("Draft Report") 329 states that the drafters intended the final
version of article 10(a) to correspond to article 10 of the draft conven-
tion.330 Article 10's negotiating history indicates that sending of judi-
cial documents by mail was intended to include service of process. 33'
In explaining the background and purpose of article 10, the Draft
Report states that the provisions of article 10 also permit "service" by
telegram if the state where the plaintiff is effecting "service" does not
object.3 32 It further states that the draft convention rejected a propo-
sal limiting postal channels to registered mail.3 33 This report clearly
refers to "service" when discussing the meaning of the various phrases
of the original article 10, which subsequently became article 10(a). 33 4
Therefore, records of the Convention's negotiating history indicate
that article 10(a), like the other provisions of the article, refers to an
alternative method of service.
6. Intent of the Signatories to the Convention
A court should construe the Convention's requirements liberally
to give effect to the signatories' intentions.335 Where the Convention
admits interpretations which may either restrict or enlarge signato-
ries' rights, a court should accept the more liberal construction.3 3 6
The Convention's preamble amply demonstrates the signatories' lib-
eral intent.
328. The Court has held that in interpreting treaties, it is proper to look to the negotiations
leading to the treaty. Chocktaw, 318 U.S. at 432.
329. See B. RISTAU, supra note 45, §§ 4-28. The draft convention preceded the final ver-
sion of the Convention which was formulated by the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law in 1964. See id. The Convention revised parts of the Hague Conventions on Civil
Procedure of 1905 and 1954. Id.; see also Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 698.
330. B. RISTAU, supra note 45, at 165-67 (citing Conference de la Hague de Droit Interna-





335. Valentine, 299 U.S. at 10; Todok, 281 U.S. at 454.
336. Jordan, 278 U.S. at 127; Hauenstein, 100 U.S. at 487; Asakura, 265 U.S. at 342.
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The preamble makes clear that the Convention's signatories in-
tended to alleviate difficulties involved in international litigation.
They sought to promote international judicial cooperation by provid-
ing a simple and expeditious procedure for service of process while
ensuring that defendants received sufficient notice.337 It is obvious
that the signatories intended to establish much more than a formal
mode of service. 338 Instead, they intended to promote simplicity and
expedience of service. 339 Interpreting the Convention as allowing ser-
vice of process by mail furthers this purpose by providing states the
option of allowing another simple and expeditious method of ser-
vice. 34° Furthermore, since service by mail meets strict due process
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard,341 it conforms
with the signatories' intent to ensure that defendants receive actual
notice of judicial documents served from abroad.
Additionally, in interpreting the Convention, a court must give
great weight to the Senate's interpretation of the Convention.342 The
Senate Committee Report on the Convention ("Senate Report") 343
reveals the Senate's understanding of the Convention. The Senate Re-
port discusses the large amount of work that the United States gov-
ernment did to establish practicable methods for service of process in
cases involving foreign litigants.3 " These efforts culminated in the
revision of Rule 4 by the addition of paragraph (). 345 The Senate
Report further discusses the liberal service methods under Rule 4(i)
and states that the Judicial Conference of the United States endorsed
the Convention as in accord with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 34 s In addition, the Senate Report states that ratification of the
Convention by the United States would not repeal or modify anything
authorized by United States law. 34 ' Obviously, the Senate did not in-
terpret the Convention to preclude methods of service of process out-
lined in Rule 4(i), including service of process by mail.
Furthermore, in his statement to the Senate Committee describ-
337. Convention, supra note 8, preamble.
338. Contra Ordmandy, 122 Misc. 2d at 955, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
339. Convention, supra note 8, preamble.
340. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
341. Id.; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
342. Koloravt v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
343. SENATE REPORT, supra note 86.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 6.
346. Id. at 7.
347. Id. at 2.
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ing the terms of the Convention, Phillip Amram, the principal United
States delegate to the Convention, 34 stated that the philosophy of the
Convention was very liberal regarding judicial assistance tech-
niques.3 49 In describing the various methods of service available
under the Convention, he recognized that the use of the Central Au-
thority was not obligatory. A plaintiff could use optional techniques
including "direct service by mail" unless the requested state ob-
jected.350 In short, the United States delegation to the Convention
interpreted article 10(a) to refer to service of process, not merely
transmitting judicial documents by mail after service of process was
complete.
7. The Practical Construction of The Convention
by the Signatories
The United States government's reactions to article 10(a) also
supports the conclusion that service of process by mail is permissible.
The Convention was drafted and the United States adopted it after
Rule 4(i), in its present form, went into effect. 3 1 In this form, Rule
4(i) allows service of process abroad by mail. 352 The Senate Report
indicates that the Senate believed the Convention was consistent with
the spirit of the laws in force at the time of the Convention's ratifica-
tion.3 53 These laws included Rule 4(i), which guarantees liberal meth-
ods of service of process abroad.
3 54
In the twenty-three years since the Senate ratified the Conven-
tion, it has not amended Rule 4(i) to prohibit plaintiffs from attempt-
ing service of process by mail on a foreign defendant who is a citizen
of a Convention signatory. 35 5 Presumably, the Advisory Committee
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would have proposed such an
amendment to Rule 4(i) if it viewed article 10(a) as not permitting
348. See id.
349. Id. at 13.
350. Id. (emphasis added).
351. Rule 4(i) went into effect in 1963. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i). The Convention was ratified
by the United States in 1967 and went into effect in 1969. Convention, supra note 8.
352. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
353. SENATE REPORT, supra note 86, at 7.
354. FED. R. Civ. P. 4; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 86, at 6 (Rule 4(i) "establishes
very liberal provisions, within the limits of due process, in a suit brought in the United States
for making service upon a person residing abroad."); C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
3, at 369.
355. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
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service of process by mail. The Senate could not have intended to
subject plaintiffs to conflicting federal law.
Other signatories' declarations to the Convention further support
this interpretation. 3 6 For example, Czechoslovakia objected to any
service under article 10, specifically referring to service by mail.
Czechoslovakia's government stated in its declaration that "in accord-
ance with Article 10 . . . judicial documents may not be served by
another contracting State through postal channels nor through the
judicial officers, officials or other competent persons. ' 357 Obviously,
the Czechoslovakian government construed article 10(a) as referring
to service of process by mail.
Several other countries have indicated the same understanding.
In its declaration of ratification, the Federal Republic of Germany
objected to any service under article 10 by stating: "Service pursuant
to Article 10 of the Convention shall not be effected. ' 358 The German
government apparently did not distinguish between "send" and
"serve." The Turkish government similarly objected to article 10
stating that it was "opposed to the use of the methods of serving judi-
cial documents listed in Article 10. " 359 Finally, the government of
Norway declared that it was "opposed to the use of such methods of
service or transmission of documents on its territory as mentioned in
Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. ' ' 360 Thus, ample evidence dem-
onstrates that many Convention signatories believed that article 10(a)
prescribed another method of service of process.361 Perhaps more re-
vealing, no signatory to the Convention has subsequently amended its
declaration to distinguish the provisions of article 10(a) or elaborate
on its special import.
362
Finally, further support for this interpretation can be found in
the Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation
of the Convention ("Special Commission Report"). 363 Held in 1977,
several years after the final version of the Convention was com-
356. See Convention, supra note 8.
357. Id. (emphasis added).
358. Id. (emphasis added).
359. Id. (emphasis added).
360. Id. (emphasis added).
361. See Rich v. Kis California, Inc., 1988 WL 47605 (M.D.N.C.).
362. Convention, supra note 8.
363. Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention of
15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 319 (1978) [hereinafter Special Commission
Report].
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pleted, 364 the Special Commission Report states that most of the
states made no objection to the service of judicial documents coming
from abroad directly by mail into their territory.365 This statement
strongly suggests that the Special Commission, which Japan attended,
interpreted the Convention as allowing service of process by mail.
366
Furthermore, the Special Commission Report contains no record of
any state, including Japan, making an objection to this interpretation
during the commission meeting.
367
Consequently, the logical conclusion following from the signato-
ries' practical construction of article 10(a) is that it allows service of
process by mail, as long as the receiving state has not objected. Since
Japan only objects to paragraphs (b) and (c) of article 10,368 courts
should interpret the Convention, consistent with the signatories' inter-
pretation, as allowing service by mail on a Japanese defendant.
B. The Effect on Japan of Allowing Service By Mail
Several courts and commentators have rightly expressed con-
cerns over the effect on Japan of interpreting article 10(a) to allow
service by mail. 369 One concern is that the internal law of Japan does
not allow direct service of process by mail in Japanese domestic litiga-
tion.370 The other concern is that Japan is a civil law country, and as
such, it considers service of process strictly an official government
function. 37' Thus, allowing direct service of process by mail from a
United States plaintiff would usurp a Japanese governmental power
and infringe on Japan's sovereignty. 372 Although these concerns are
legitimate and deserve attention, as the following sections demon-
strate, they are easily alleviated without resort to an unduly restrictive
interpretation of article 10(a). 3
73
364. Id.
365. Id. at 326.
366. Id. at 319.
367. Id.
368. Convention, supra note 8.
369. See, e.g., Suzuki, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1480-81, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 379; see also Fujita,
supra note 25; Ohara, Judicial Assistance to be Afforded by Japan for Proceedings in the United
States, 23 INT'L L. 10, 14-18 (1989); but see Jorden, supra note 146.
370. See sources cited supra note 369.
371. See Fujita, supra note 25, at 72-73; Jorden, supra note 146.
372. See Fujita, supra note 25; Jorden, supra note 146; see also C.A. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 3, at 367. "Some countries view service of process within their borders in
connection with litigation pending elsewhere as a 'judicial,' and therefore a 'sovereign,' act that
is offensive to the policies or contrary to the law of the particular country." Id.
373. See infra notes 374-94 and accompanying text; see generally Jorden, supra note 146.
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1. Japanese Law
As the court recognized in Suzuki, Japan's internal law prohibits
direct service of process by mail between two private litigants.374
However, just as in the United States, the Constitution of Japan pro-
vides that treaty provisions take precedence over existing domestic
statutory law.375 Therefore, since Japan ratified the Convention, the
Convention's provisions supersede any existing Japanese domestic
service laws. 37
6
A further argument, however, is that since the internal law of
Japan does not allow service by direct mail, Japan could not have
believed article 10(a) allowed service of process by mail. If it did, it
would have objected to article 10(a) as being inconsistent with its do-
mestic laws governing service. 377 This argument loses force when one
considers that other Convention signatories, such as the Federal Re-
public of Germany, recognized that article 10(a) allowed service by
mail and in accordance with its civil law, expressly objected to article
10(a). 378 Japan had notice of such objections and presumably could
have similarly objected if it believed such an objection was desira-
ble.3 79 Furthermore, in debating the terms of the Convention, Ger-
many specifically expressed its dissatisfaction with article 10's
inclusion in the Convention.380 Japan attended the Convention and
must surely have been aware of Germany's objections.38' Neverthe-
less, there is no record of Japan joining in this objection.38 2
Finally, no record exists of Japan ever objecting to, or even com-
menting on, article 10(a). a33 Presumably, Japan, realizing the prece-
dence the Convention's terms would have over its domestic rules,
would have objected to article 10(a) if it believed foreign litigants
374. Suzuki, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1480-81, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 379; see also Fujita, supra note
25; Jorden, supra note 146.
375. Jorden, supra note 146, at 78-79.
376. Id.
377. Suzuki, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1480-81, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 379; Fujita, supra note 25, at
78.
378. Convention, supra note 8; see also Jorden, supra note 146, at 75.
379. Under article 31 of the Convention, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nether-
lands must give notice of the ratifications and declarations, including any objections, of all
signatory states to the Convention to the other signatory states. Convention, supra note 8, art.
31.
380. See Jorden, supra note 146, at 75.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Convention, supra note 8; Special Commission Report, supra note 363, at 326; Jorden,
supra note 146, at 75.
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could undesirably construe article 10(a) as permitting a procedure
that is contrary to Japanese law. This is especially true considering
the long history of controversy article 10(a) has fostered regarding
service upon Japanese defendants in United States litigation.
2. Japanese Sovereignty
The second concern is that allowing service of process by mail
directly on a Japanese national would infringe on Japan's sover-
eignty.384 This concern stems from two arguments. First, since Japan
is a civil law country and thus regards service of process as an official
government function, allowing service of process by mail would in-
fringe on the Japanese government's ability to protect Japanese
citizens. 38 5 This perspective disproportionately protects Japanese liti-
gants and places too much emphasis on the Japanese government's
role.
38 6
Japanese citizens would not, in fact, be left unprotected in United
States courts by allowing service of process by mail. Instead, they
would be placed on more equal ground with United States litigants.
As the Newport court reasoned, neither the Convention at issue here
nor the Evidence Convention was intended to shield a Japanese de-
fendant from the normal burdens of litigation in United States
courts.387 The court concluded that if article 10(a) was construed as
not allowing service of process by mail, Japanese companies doing
business in the United States would enjoy an extraordinary advantage
as potential litigants in United States courts. 388 Japanese companies
would be much less amenable to process from United States plaintiffs,
giving them a distinct advantage over United States businesses and
consumers in civil and commercial disputes. Taking the Newport
384. See Fujita, supra note 25.
385. Id.; Jorden, supra note 146.
[One] Japanese commentator has taken the position that service from abroad by mail
on Japanese defendants located in Japan ipsofacto fails to satisfy [Japanese law]. The
only interest served by the acceptance of such an analysis by a Japanese tribunal
would be Japanese sovereignty, or . . . procedural jingoism. [Japanese law] and the
Convention, should be read as above all insuring fairness to litigants. Japanese tribu-
nals should focus on the central issue of whether or not a given defendant actually
received notice, rather than on the metaphysics of sovereignty. Over-reliance on the
issue of sovereignty would ultimately lead to unfairness to foreign plaintiffs rather
than fairness to defendants.
Id. at 90.
386. See Jorden, supra note 146, at 90.
387. Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp.
1525, 1542 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
388. Id.
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court's reasoning one step further, one could argue that this infringes
on United States, not Japanese, sovereignty by diminishing the United
States government's ability to protect its citizens.
The second argument is that Japan objected to other more formal
modes of service contained in article 10(b) and (c), and allowing ser-
vice by mail would undermine these objections and the role of Japan's
Central Authority. 389 This argument has little merit. Japan's Central
Authority has the same role as every other Central Authority of a
signatory state that has not objected to article 10(a). There is no rea-
son to elevate Japan's Central Authority to some higher position, pre-
sumably representing Japan's sovereignty. If Japan is concerned that
service of process by mail under article 10(a) undermines its objec-
tions to article 10(b) and (c), or infringes on the role of its Central
Authority, it can formally object to article 10(a). 39° Furthermore, as
the court pointed out in Lemme, if Japan's interest in sovereignty is to
promote the least intrusive means of notifying its citizens of lawsuits
against them, it would be logical to permit only the Central Authority
or the postal service to serve process.
391
Therefore, concerns for the effect interpreting article 10(a) as al-
lowing service of process by mail would have on Japan, while well
intentioned, are overstated. Japan has the ability to safeguard its own
internal law and sovereignty. 392 Furthermore, Japan should have the
burden of clarifying any ambiguity in its interpretation or ratification
of the Convention, especially when such clarification can be rendered
so easily.
393
389. See Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97, 100, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298 (1985).
390. Convention, supra note 8, art. 21.
391. Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
392. See Jorden, supra note 146.
393. Id.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry should be informed of the manner in which courts in
the United States have interpreted Japan's failure to object to article 10(a) of the
Convention. If, alas, the Foreign Ministry were to decide that jingoism should tri-
umph over the principle of judicial cooperation (upon which the Convention is
based), the signatory states should be informed in appropriate fashion-a revised
Japanese declaration registered with the Dutch Foreign Ministry in the Hague in
accordance with article 21 of the Convention.
Id. at 90. See also Ohara, supra note 369, at 16. The author asserts that: "In order to avoid
misunderstandings by foreigners that Japan permits the validity of service by mail inasmuch as
it did not object to article 10(a) of the Convention, . . the Japanese Government should have
declared, or even now should declare, its objection to it." Id.
To clarify its interpretation of the Convention or to object to article 10(a), Japan need
merely notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. See Convention, supra note
8, art. 21.
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V. CONCLUSION
At present, United States courts disagree over whether article
10(a) of the Convention allows service of process by mail on a Japa-
nese defendant. While some decisions have allowed service by mail
under article 10(a), the opinions were based on faulty, cursory analy-
ses and incorrect factual assumptions. Other decisions, representing
the current trend not to allow service by mail under article 10(a), are
based on overly restrictive and erroneous interpretations of the Con-
vention's text and purpose.
This split in authority needlessly confuses United States litigants,
increases litigation costs and chances for statute of limitations con-
flicts, and wastes valuable court time. Additionally, the present trend
of interpreting article 10(a) as denying service of process by mail
places an unfair burden on United States plaintiffs. Finally, it gives
Japanese businesses an unfair advantage over both their United States
counterparts and consumers in the United States domestic market.
Therefore, the need for courts to follow a more logical analysis of
article 10(a) is clear. This Comment suggests that courts should in-
terpret article 10(a) in its proper context within the Convention as
allowing service of process by mail. To reach this conclusion, a court
need only follow ordinary rules of treaty interpretation.
United States courts, while attempting to safeguard the rights of
all litigants before them, are currently favoring Japanese defendants.
Although the signatories to the Convention sought to promote judi-
cial assistance while protecting the rights of litigants, this goal must
be accomplished without unduly restricting the rights of United States
plaintiffs.394 If the Japanese government believes that interpreting ar-
ticle 10(a) as allowing service of process by mail infringes on its laws
or its sovereignty, it can object to it. Until it does, however, United
States courts should interpret article 10(a) as allowing a United States
plaintiff to serve a Japanese defendant by mail.
Craig R. Armstrong*
394. Article 10 of the Convention states that the "Convention shall not interfere with...
the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad[.]"
Convention, supra note 8, art. 10(a) (emphasis added); see also Jorden, supra note 146, at 90.
Jorden concludes that "Article 10(a) of the Convention was intended to obligate signatory
states that did not object thereto to recognize the validity of service by mail .... By ratifying
the Convention and failing to make a formal declaration objecting to article 10(a), Japan as-
sumed said obligation as a matter of international law." Id.
* To my parents for their constant support throughout my law school experience.
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